Checkmate: Epistemic Killshot Against Islam
Islam & Epistemology
Given that the Quran is supposed to be the pinnacle of divine revelation, Muhammad the exemplar for all mankind, and Islam the only religion accepted by Allah, it is quite strange then that given Islam’s extensive preoccupation with legal dos-and-don’ts, Muhammad never left any instructions how to derive legal rulings. While Muhammad was alive, people asked him questions and he responded. Then one day he died, and no one knew how to formulate legal rulings, at least not according to a systematized methodology.
The process of formulating epistemic principles to be utilized in making legal judgments is precisely how Muslims arrive at the various contradictory jurisprudential schools, e.g., Shafi`i, Maliki, Hanafi, Hanbali, etc.
Simply identifying epistemic sources, namely “Quran and Sunna”, does not inform us of the methodology utilized how to apply those sources. For example, how are we to know what verses in the Quran are abrogated? This fundamental point regarding the most revered book by Muslims would seem straightforward. However, Islamic scholars are in disagreement. In other words, there is no unanimity among Muslims what verses in the Quran are to be taken as authoritative when deriving legal rulings. There is no consensus among Islamic scholars which verses of the Quran are abrogated. There are copious others examples one can give apart from this one. But that is beyond the focus of this article.
Moreover, there is a need for other epistemic sources besides “Quran and Sunna” when the existing material in the “Quran and Sunna” is deemed insufficient. For example, utilizing an analogy, known as qiyas قياس, which means to derive a truth about something that is unknown by grounding it in something that is known. For example, since the consumption of alcohol is forbidden due its intoxicating behaviour, the consumption of anything that is intoxicating is forbidden, even though those things are not explicitly mentioned in the Quran or Sunna.
Different jurisprudential schools exist because each represents a different epistemic framework, namely different epistemic sources, criteria, and methodology how to derive legal rulings expressing the supposed divinely-ordained shari`a شريعة. This is why there are a plethora of different schools. In fact, there have historically been a lot more schools than the well-known four in Sunni Islam (Shafi`i, Maliki, Hanafi, Hanbali), having died out not due to errors but, rather, the lack of students in succeeding generations to carry on their legacies, e.g., Laythi, Thawri, Dhahiri, Jariri, etc.
Differences also can and do exist within the same school, which are due to differences in application of an underlying common epistemic framework. However, differences between schools are by and large due to competing epistemic frameworks. This is why, historically, scholars insisted that a Muslim must adhere to one jurisprudential school so as to not mix and match different epistemologies by taking from multiple schools. In order to transcend all the schools altogether and exercise complete independence when deriving legal rulings, a scholar must set forth his own epistemic framework. A so-called “scholar” does not have the freedom to do as he pleases simply because he is considered knowledgeable.
Traditionally, Islamic scholars have certainly not done what so many (ignorant) Muslims in the modern day do: say that one need only follow ‘Quran and Sunna’, and leave it to themselves to be arbiters on how to do so. Following the ‘Quran and Sunna’ is not the issue. Rather, it is how the ‘Quran and Sunna’ fit into an overall epistemic framework, namely, how one identifies and applies information from the ‘Quran and Sunna’. This is where the various jurisprudential schools come into play. And when the ‘Quran and Sunna’ are not sufficient, then one must rely on other epistemic sources. That other sources apart from the Quran are required is evidenced by simple facts as the Quranic injunction to shorten prayers while on a journey, yet the Quran never tells you how to pray nor does it tell you what constitutes a journey.
Differences between the schools, or even opinions within the same school, exist because it is all guess work, since there are no instructions from Muhammad how to go about formulating legal rulings. And in guessing, Muslims cannot be 100% certain that their epistemic framework represents Muhammad’s personal undisclosed methodology, which often simply appears to be him just making stuff up based on his own desires, as his beloved child-bride A`isha once famously remarked that Allah hastens to satisfy Muhammad’s wishes.
That Islamic law is fundamentally epistemic guesswork, consider the following statement from Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee’s book Following a Single School and Rules for Issuing Fatwas:
IN WHAT CASES IS THE QAWL (OPINION) OF THE IMAM OR OF THE SCHOOL TO BE GIVEN UP?
Al-Haskafi says the following in the opening chapter of his book: ‘If we are asked about our opinions and about the opinions of the rival school, we will say by necessity, “Our opinions are correct with a probability of our error (in some cases), and the opinions of our rivals are incorrect, with a probability of being correct (in some cases).”’
Following a Single School and Rules for Issuing Fatwas, Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee, Center for Excellence in Research, 2016, p. 78.
Since no one school can guarantee it is absolutely 100% correct, by necessity all have to recognize, or at least tolerate, other schools because of the probability that those other schools may, in fact, be correct.
Islamic scholars are very well aware of this epistemic problem. But the Muslim masses, being ignorant of this issue, in order not to doubt in Islam, are fed the lie and nonsense that differences in Islam are a “mercy” from Allah.
As long as a person holds to the major foundational aspects of Islam, like believing in Allah and Muhammad’s alleged prophethood, praying, fasting, giving to charity, and making a pilgrimage to some cube in the middle of the desert, then they are to be reckoned Muslim, irrespective of any secondary differences that exist within the Muslim community at large, or umma أمة. The idea is to preserve the overall unity of the Muslim community by not letting differences on supposedly secondary matters be grounds for division.
In reality, though, this is a massive cope. Differences arise because there is no precisely-defined epistemology from which to derive Islamic law.
Nevertheless, let’s entertain the idea that differences are divine mercy. If that is the case, then by necessity Muslims are forced to defend the rulings of schools they do not belong to or follow. Basically, a Muslim paints himself into the corner not being able to escape by simply saying things like “Since I do not follow such-and-such school, I do not have to defend it.” Well, in fact, yes, you do. If you believe that differences are divine mercy, then you believe the other schools are authentic expressions of Islam. So, yes, you do have to defend criticisms against schools you do not follow as those are still “Islam”.
In other words, for those of us doing apologetics contra Islam, it is completely valid to criticize any one of the school as they are all authentic representations of Islam and Muslims have to defend all those schools irrespective of whether or not they personally follow them. That is the epistemic problem Muslims get themselves into when taking the position that differences are divine mercy.
But if the idea of differences being a divine mercy is rejected, then there is still the problem of epistemic uncertainty. It is impossible to demonstrate which of the schools is authentic. And they cannot all be authentic given the plurality of conflicting rulings.
If every single situation allows for a plurality of rulings basically covering the spectrum of possible options, and they all represent authentic shari`a, then one does not really have shari`a. Rather, Islam becomes a system that justifiably permits a spectrum of competing contradictory ideas. That sounds more like confusion than it does divine guidance.
Just pick up any book on comparative jurisprudence where the legal rulings are compared between the various schools, and it is the same thing over and over again: Practically every single situation admits to multiple conflicting rulings, all touted as representing authentic positions.
For example, to a high degree the Hanafi school is completely at odds with many of the rulings arrived at by the Shafi`i school, yet both represent authentic Islam. That is not to say the schools never agree on anything, because they do. But rather, the degree to which they admit to a plurality of conflicting rulings is such that it quite literally makes the whole jurisprudential venture a complete joke. Likewise, when you read Imam Nawawi’s commentary on Sahih Muslim, he frequently discusses how the hadiths are used by the various schools, and also conflicting rulings within the same school, and there you see the same thing over and over again: Irreconcilable conflicting rulings all to be taken as authentic expressions of Islam.
To give one example, and this example just happened to be what I was reading about at the time, so I did not go out of my way to select it for any particular reason. The discussion is whether or not a person who is in the ritual state of ihram إحرام, meaning they have formally initiated the process of making the pilgrimage to Mecca (known as hajj حجّ) and are in a special consecrated state, if such a person can eat animals that have been hunted. The legal judgements are in disagreement. Some legal scholars say that the person may not eat of a hunted animal while in this state. This prohibition is categorical, across the board, it is a total prohibition. Other legal scholars say that the person may eat as long as he did not participate in the hunting. Each side has its evidential proofs.
This example is a simple illustration at how the whole system is a complete joke. These two positions on just this one issue are mutually exclusive. They cannot both be valid expressions of shari`a. Yet, the uncertain nature inherent to Islamic jurisprudence has to admit to both rulings, even if one can provide a supposed superior explanation why one set of proofs should trump another.
And this is just one example. The pattern is the same: time and time again, over and over again, there exist conflicting, mutually exclusive, contradictory, legal rulings on the same issue, all of which are recognized as authentic expressions of shari`a. This state of affairs is the norm in Islamic jurisprudence and not the exception.
To reiterate what was stated before: If every single situation allows for a plurality of rulings basically covering the spectrum of possible options, and they all represent authentic shari`a, then you do not really have shari`a. Rather, you have a system that justifiably permits a plurality of opposing opinions.
Ask yourself the following question: Did Muhammad provide the criteria how to determine what is authentic?
If the answer is “yes”, then provide the evidence for this. That is going to be impossible because such evidence does not exist. The existence of the various schools proves this fact.
So the answer to the question has to be a resounding “no”. Knowing that Muhammad never provided the criteria how to determine what is authentic, then the necessary follow-up questions are: 1) Who gets to establish the criteria? and, 2) What normative authority can enforce the establishment of that criteria?
To illustrate the point, take, for example, a very problematic epistemic scenario Muslims face. If we consider Muhammad’s Sunna (as encapsulated by hadiths) to be an epistemic source for deriving legal rulings, then how does one satisfactorily resolve the epistemic problem that Bukhari requires the narrators of the hadiths that he recorded to have met each other while Muslim did not?
That is an epistemic question irrespective of the contents of hadiths and their associated chains of transmission. Answering this epistemic question come prior to even entertaining such things as hadith methodology, authenticating the biographies of the transmitters, etc.
To be clear, the epistemic issue has nothing to do with the detailed reasonings of Bukhari and Muslim that differentiates them and their respective approaches. The epistemic issue is Bukhari and Muslim each arbitrarily setting their own respective standards and then who within the Islamic community can enforce those standards. Principally, though Bukhari and Muslim both aim to present us with the authentic Sunna of Muhammad, they both present arbitrary competing epistemic frameworks.
Then you have the issue of how hadiths are utilized. For example, the Shafi`i school requires that a hadith need only be graded sahih صحيح while the Hanafi school requires that a hadith be both sahih and mashhur مشهور (well-known, popular).
Muslims face a very steep uphill battle to demonstrate that their epistemology does not amount to guesswork. In a nutshell, Islamic epistemology is arbitrary.
Islam is supposed to be a complete system of divinely-ordained governance. In fact, it is all just a bunch of made up nonsense.